io.github.GuardBee/ai-code-scanner·Dev tools

ai-code-scanner

Scans code for insecure LLM/AI integration: exposed keys, unsafe output, prompt injection

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ai-securitykvkkmcpmcp-securitymodel-context-protocolowaspsecurity-scanner

Connect

npm
Terminal
$claude mcp add ai-code-scanner \  -- npx -y @guardbee/[email protected]

Environment variables

Nothing to configure — it works as is.

Security review

Review passed

Reviewed 18m ago.

metadata
scanned
packages
1 checked

No findings.

Tools

This server runs on your machine, so its tool list is not fetched before install — the README below describes what it offers.

@guardbee/mcp-ai-code-scanner

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An MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that scans your codebase for security patterns commonly found in LLM/AI integrations.

While secret-scanner looks for leaked secrets/API keys, this package looks for patterns: how much a model's output is trusted, how privileged the tools it can call are, what data is sent to a third-party LLM — risks that a static credential scan can't catch.

This package sends usage telemetry by default (tool name + short parameters, the scanned code is never included — see @guardbee/mcp-telemetry). Disable with GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY=0.

Claude ──► ai-code-scanner ──► Your codebase
              │
              ├─ Client-exposure    (dangerouslyAllowBrowser: true)
              ├─ Output handling    (eval(llmOutput), unvalidated JSON.parse)
              ├─ Excessive agency   (an agent tool named execute_command)
              ├─ Data privacy       (email/national ID interpolated directly into a prompt)
              └─ Prompt injection   (raw request data mixed into a system prompt)

Features

  • 10 patterns, 5 categories — client-exposure, output-handling, excessive-agency, data-privacy, prompt-injection
  • Every finding includes why it's risky and what to do about it (recommendation) — not just "found it"
  • SARIF 2.1.0 output — CI/CD integration (GitHub Code Scanning, etc.)
  • Config file support via guardbee.yml
  • Custom rule packs — extend detection with org-specific patterns (KVKK/GDPR field names, internal tool names) via JSON files, no fork required
  • 36 unit tests — a positive and a negative (false-positive) scenario for every built-in pattern, plus custom-rule loading/validation

Quick Start

Claude Desktop / MCP Client

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "guardbee-ai-code-scanner": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-ai-code-scanner"]
    }
  }
}

CLI (CI/CD)

npx @guardbee/mcp-ai-code-scanner scan ./src --fail-on=high --format=sarif > results.sarif

MCP Tools

ToolDescription
scan_textScans a given text/code snippet
scan_fileScans a single file
scan_directoryRecursively scans a directory (node_modules, .git, dist skipped automatically)
list_patternsLists all supported patterns by category

Detected Patterns

CategoryPatternSeverityWhat it means
client-exposureopenai_dangerously_allow_browsercriticalOpenAI key leaked to the browser
client-exposureclient_bundled_ai_api_keycriticalAn AI key enters the client bundle via NEXT_PUBLIC_/VITE_/REACT_APP_
output-handlingeval_llm_outputcriticalModel output executed as code via eval()/Function()
output-handlingexec_llm_outputcriticalModel output passed to a shell command (command injection)
output-handlingllm_output_dangerously_set_inner_htmlhighModel output rendered as raw HTML (XSS)
output-handlingllm_json_no_validationmediumModel output JSON.parse'd without schema validation
excessive-agencyexcessive_agency_tool_namehighA tool that grants an agent shell/code execution
excessive-agencyunbounded_agent_loopmediumAn agent loop with no iteration bound (cost/DoS)
data-privacypii_field_in_llm_prompthighData like email/national ID/card number goes directly into a prompt
prompt-injectionunsanitized_input_in_system_promptmediumRaw request/user data mixed into a system prompt

These are heuristic findings — a static text-pattern scan, not a full AST analysis. Designed for a low false-positive rate, but every finding should still be reviewed manually.


Configuration (guardbee.yml)

ai-code-scanner:
  fail-on: high       # any | critical | high | medium | low | none
  max-files: 5000
  rules-dir: .guardbee/rules   # custom rule packs, see below
  exclude:
    - ".test.ts"
    - "fixtures/"

Custom rules

Built-in patterns cover common AI/LLM integration mistakes, but field names and internal conventions (e.g. which prop names carry KVKK-regulated data) are project-specific. Drop one or more JSON files into .guardbee/rules/ (configurable via rules-dir) and they're merged with the built-ins at scan time — for both the CLI and the MCP server (list_patterns marks them (custom)).

A file holds a single rule object or an array of them:

{
  "id": "kvkk_musteri_tc_no",
  "name": "musteriTcNo interpolated into a prompt",
  "category": "data-privacy",
  "pattern": "musteriTcNo",
  "flags": "gi",
  "severity": "high",
  "recommendation": "Mask the national ID before it enters the prompt."
}

category is one of client-exposure | output-handling | excessive-agency | data-privacy | prompt-injection | cost-control; severity is one of critical | high | medium | low. pattern is a JS regex source string (flags defaults to "g"). A rule id that collides with a built-in or another custom rule is rejected — the scanner keeps running but reports the problem on stderr and skips that entry.


Development

npm run build
npm test             # 36 unit tests

License

MIT — GuardBee

From the server's repository — third-party content, read it before running anything it suggests.

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