aws-secrets-manager
Store and rotate secrets in AWS Secrets Manager. Configure automatic rotation, access policies, and application integration. Use when managing secrets in AWS environments or requiring automatic credential rotation.
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SKILL.md
AWS Secrets Manager
Securely store, manage, and rotate secrets in AWS.
When to Use This Skill
Use this skill when:
- Storing database credentials, API keys, or tokens in AWS
- Implementing automatic credential rotation for RDS or other services
- Replacing hardcoded secrets in application code or config files
- Integrating secrets into ECS, EKS, or Lambda workloads
- Meeting compliance requirements for secret management and rotation
Prerequisites
- AWS account with appropriate IAM permissions
- AWS CLI v2 installed and configured
- IAM policy allowing
secretsmanager:*actions (or scoped permissions) - For rotation: Lambda execution role and VPC access to target services
- Python 3.9+ with
boto3for SDK examples
Secret Creation and Management
# Create a secret with JSON structure
aws secretsmanager create-secret \
--name myapp/production/database \
--description "Production database credentials" \
--secret-string '{"username":"dbadmin","password":"S3cur3P@ssw0rd!","engine":"postgres","host":"db.internal.example.com","port":5432,"dbname":"myapp"}' \
--tags '[{"Key":"Environment","Value":"production"},{"Key":"Team","Value":"platform"}]'
# Create a secret with KMS encryption (custom key)
aws secretsmanager create-secret \
--name myapp/production/api-key \
--description "Third-party API key" \
--secret-string "ak_live_xxxxxxxxxxxx" \
--kms-key-id alias/secrets-key
# Create a binary secret (certificates, keys)
aws secretsmanager create-secret \
--name myapp/production/tls-cert \
--secret-binary fileb://server.pfx
# Get secret value
aws secretsmanager get-secret-value \
--secret-id myapp/production/database \
--query 'SecretString' --output text | jq .
# Get a specific version
aws secretsmanager get-secret-value \
--secret-id myapp/production/database \
--version-stage AWSPREVIOUS
# Update secret value
aws secretsmanager put-secret-value \
--secret-id myapp/production/database \
--secret-string '{"username":"dbadmin","password":"N3wS3cur3P@ss!","engine":"postgres","host":"db.internal.example.com","port":5432,"dbname":"myapp"}'
# List all secrets
aws secretsmanager list-secrets \
--filters Key=name,Values=myapp/production
# Delete secret (with recovery window)
aws secretsmanager delete-secret \
--secret-id myapp/production/old-key \
--recovery-window-in-days 7
# Restore a deleted secret
aws secretsmanager restore-secret \
--secret-id myapp/production/old-key
# Tag a secret
aws secretsmanager tag-resource \
--secret-id myapp/production/database \
--tags '[{"Key":"RotationEnabled","Value":"true"}]'
Automatic Rotation
Enable Rotation
# Enable rotation with an existing Lambda function
aws secretsmanager rotate-secret \
--secret-id myapp/production/database \
--rotation-lambda-arn arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:123456789012:function:SecretsManagerRDSPostgreSQLRotation \
--rotation-rules '{"AutomaticallyAfterDays":30,"ScheduleExpression":"rate(30 days)"}'
# Trigger immediate rotation
aws secretsmanager rotate-secret \
--secret-id myapp/production/database
# Check rotation status
aws secretsmanager describe-secret \
--secret-id myapp/production/database \
--query '{RotationEnabled:RotationEnabled,RotationLambdaARN:RotationLambdaARN,RotationRules:RotationRules,LastRotatedDate:LastRotatedDate}'
Lambda Rotation Function
"""rotation_function.py - Custom rotation Lambda for database credentials."""
import boto3
import json
import logging
import psycopg2
logger = logging.getLogger()
logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
def lambda_handler(event, context):
"""Secrets Manager rotation handler.
The rotation process has four steps:
1. createSecret - Generate new secret value
2. setSecret - Apply the new secret to the target service
3. testSecret - Verify the new secret works
4. finishSecret - Mark rotation complete
"""
secret_arn = event['SecretId']
token = event['ClientRequestToken']
step = event['Step']
client = boto3.client('secretsmanager')
metadata = client.describe_secret(SecretId=secret_arn)
if not metadata.get('RotationEnabled'):
raise ValueError(f"Secret {secret_arn} does not have rotation enabled")
versions = metadata.get('VersionIdsToStages', {})
if token not in versions:
raise ValueError(f"Secret version {token} has no stage for rotation")
if step == "createSecret":
create_secret(client, secret_arn, token)
elif step == "setSecret":
set_secret(client, secret_arn, token)
elif step == "testSecret":
test_secret(client, secret_arn, token)
elif step == "finishSecret":
finish_secret(client, secret_arn, token)
else:
raise ValueError(f"Invalid step: {step}")
def create_secret(client, secret_arn, token):
"""Generate a new secret value."""
current = client.get_secret_value(
SecretId=secret_arn, VersionStage="AWSCURRENT"
)
current_dict = json.loads(current['SecretString'])
new_password = client.get_random_password(
PasswordLength=32,
ExcludeCharacters='/@"\\',
RequireEachIncludedType=True,
)['RandomPassword']
current_dict['password'] = new_password
client.put_secret_value(
SecretId=secret_arn,
ClientRequestToken=token,
SecretString=json.dumps(current_dict),
VersionStages=['AWSPENDING'],
)
logger.info(f"createSecret: New secret version created for {secret_arn}")
def set_secret(client, secret_arn, token):
"""Apply the new secret to the target database."""
pending = client.get_secret_value(
SecretId=secret_arn, VersionId=token, VersionStage="AWSPENDING"
)
pending_dict = json.loads(pending['SecretString'])
current = client.get_secret_value(
SecretId=secret_arn, VersionStage="AWSCURRENT"
)
current_dict = json.loads(current['SecretString'])
conn = psycopg2.connect(
host=current_dict['host'],
port=current_dict.get('port', 5432),
user=current_dict['username'],
password=current_dict['password'],
dbname=current_dict.get('dbname', 'postgres'),
)
conn.autocommit = True
with conn.cursor() as cur:
cur.execute(
"ALTER USER %s WITH PASSWORD %s",
(pending_dict['username'], pending_dict['password']),
)
conn.close()
logger.info(f"setSecret: Password updated in database for {secret_arn}")
def test_secret(client, secret_arn, token):
"""Verify the new secret works."""
pending = client.get_secret_value(
SecretId=secret_arn, VersionId=token, VersionStage="AWSPENDING"
)
pending_dict = json.loads(pending['SecretString'])
conn = psycopg2.connect(
host=pending_dict['host'],
port=pending_dict.get('port', 5432),
user=pending_dict['username'],
password=pending_dict['password'],
dbname=pending_dict.get('dbname', 'postgres'),
)
conn.close()
logger.info(f"testSecret: New credentials verified for {secret_arn}")
def finish_secret(client, secret_arn, token):
"""Finalize the rotation by updating version stages."""
metadata = client.describe_secret(SecretId=secret_arn)
versions = metadata.get('VersionIdsToStages', {})
current_version = None
for version_id, stages in versions.items():
if "AWSCURRENT" in stages:
if version_id == token:
logger.info("finishSecret: Version already marked AWSCURRENT")
return
current_version = version_id
break
client.update_secret_version_stage(
SecretId=secret_arn,
VersionStage="AWSCURRENT",
MoveToVersionId=token,
RemoveFromVersionId=current_version,
)
logger.info(f"finishSecret: Rotation complete for {secret_arn}")
Rotation Lambda Terraform
resource "aws_lambda_function" "rotation" {
filename = "rotation_function.zip"
function_name = "secrets-rotation-postgresql"
role = aws_iam_role.rotation.arn
handler = "rotation_function.lambda_handler"
runtime = "python3.11"
timeout = 60
vpc_config {
subnet_ids = var.private_subnet_ids
security_group_ids = [aws_security_group.rotation.id]
}
environment {
variables = {
SECRETS_MANAGER_ENDPOINT = "https://secretsmanager.${var.region}.amazonaws.com"
}
}
}
resource "aws_lambda_permission" "secrets_manager" {
action = "lambda:InvokeFunction"
function_name = aws_lambda_function.rotation.function_name
principal = "secretsmanager.amazonaws.com"
statement_id = "AllowSecretsManager"
}
resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret_rotation" "db" {
secret_id = aws_secretsmanager_secret.db.id
rotation_lambda_arn = aws_lambda_function.rotation.arn
rotation_rules {
automatically_after_days = 30
}
}
Application Integration
Python SDK
import boto3
import json
from functools import lru_cache
def get_secret(secret_name: str, region: str = "us-east-1") -> dict:
"""Retrieve and parse a secret from AWS Secrets Manager."""
client = boto3.client("secretsmanager", region_name=region)
response = client.get_secret_value(SecretId=secret_name)
if "SecretString" in response:
return json.loads(response["SecretString"])
else:
import base64
return base64.b64decode(response["SecretBinary"])
@lru_cache(maxsize=32)
def get_cached_secret(secret_name: str) -> dict:
"""Cached secret retrieval. Clear cache on rotation events."""
return get_secret(secret_name)
# Usage
creds = get_secret("myapp/production/database")
connection_string = (
f"postgresql://{creds['username']}:{creds['password']}"
f"@{creds['host']}:{creds['port']}/{creds['dbname']}"
)
ECS Task Definition
{
"containerDefinitions": [
{
"name": "myapp",
"image": "ghcr.io/acme/myapp:v1.0.0",
"secrets": [
{
"name": "DB_USERNAME",
"valueFrom": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:123456789:secret:myapp/production/database:username::"
},
{
"name": "DB_PASSWORD",
"valueFrom": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:123456789:secret:myapp/production/database:password::"
},
{
"name": "API_KEY",
"valueFrom": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:123456789:secret:myapp/production/api-key"
}
]
}
],
"executionRoleArn": "arn:aws:iam::123456789:role/ecsTaskExecutionRole"
}
EKS with External Secrets Operator
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
kind: SecretStore
metadata:
name: aws-secrets-manager
namespace: production
spec:
provider:
aws:
service: SecretsManager
region: us-east-1
auth:
jwt:
serviceAccountRef:
name: external-secrets-sa
---
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: db-credentials
namespace: production
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
name: aws-secrets-manager
kind: SecretStore
target:
name: db-credentials
creationPolicy: Owner
data:
- secretKey: username
remoteRef:
key: myapp/production/database
property: username
- secretKey: password
remoteRef:
key: myapp/production/database
property: password
Resource-Based Policy
# Restrict secret access to specific roles
aws secretsmanager put-resource-policy \
--secret-id myapp/production/database \
--resource-policy '{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {
"AWS": [
"arn:aws:iam::123456789:role/myapp-ecs-task-role",
"arn:aws:iam::123456789:role/myapp-lambda-role"
]
},
"Action": [
"secretsmanager:GetSecretValue"
],
"Resource": "*",
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"aws:RequestedRegion": "us-east-1"
}
}
},
{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Principal": "*",
"Action": "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
"Resource": "*",
"Condition": {
"StringNotEquals": {
"aws:PrincipalAccount": "123456789012"
}
}
}
]
}'
Troubleshooting
| Problem | Cause | Solution |
|---|---|---|
AccessDeniedException on GetSecretValue | IAM policy missing permission | Add secretsmanager:GetSecretValue to the role; check resource-based policy |
| Rotation fails with Lambda timeout | Lambda cannot reach database | Ensure Lambda is in same VPC with route to DB; check security groups |
| Secret value is empty after rotation | createSecret step failed | Check Lambda CloudWatch logs; verify random password generation works |
| ECS container fails to start | Secret ARN format incorrect | Use full ARN with :: for JSON key extraction; verify secret exists |
| Application uses old credentials after rotation | Client caching stale values | Implement cache invalidation on rotation; reduce cache TTL |
| Rotation Lambda permission error | Missing lambda:InvokeFunction permission | Add aws_lambda_permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com principal |
| KMS decrypt fails | Secret KMS key policy missing role | Add the accessing role to the KMS key policy's kms:Decrypt principals |
Best Practices
- Enable automatic rotation with 30-day intervals minimum
- Use resource-based policies in addition to IAM policies (defense in depth)
- Encrypt secrets with customer-managed KMS keys (not default)
- Implement least-privilege access (only the roles that need each secret)
- Use secret versioning for safe rollback during rotation issues
- Monitor secret access with CloudTrail and alert on unusual patterns
- Structure secret names hierarchically:
{app}/{env}/{secret-type} - Never log secret values; log only secret ARNs and access metadata
- Test rotation in staging before enabling in production
- Set up CloudWatch alarms for rotation failures
Related Skills
- hashicorp-vault - Multi-cloud secrets
- aws-iam - IAM policies
- azure-keyvault - Azure secret management
- gcp-secret-manager - GCP secret management
Files
2- SKILL.md
189c68ec8f14.5 KB - references/secrets-patterns.md
53d3f616872.4 KB
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