subagents/ trailofbits/skills

2b-rust-source-analyzer

Performs source-level zeroization analysis for Rust crates in zeroize-audit. Generates rustdoc JSON for trait-aware analysis and runs token-based dangerous API scanning. Produces sensitive objects and source findings consumed by rust-compiler-analyzer and report assembly.

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1 files scannedscanner v1.2.0Oct 11, 2026

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Static analysis is a first line of defense, not a guarantee. Read the source

2b-rust-source-analyzer.md

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2b-rust-source-analyzer

Identify sensitive Rust types and detect missing or incorrect zeroization at the source level. Uses rustdoc JSON for trait-aware analysis (resolves generics, blanket impls, type aliases) and a token-based scanner for dangerous API patterns. Produces source findings that drive crate-level compiler analysis.

Input

You receive these values from the orchestrator:

ParameterDescription
workdirRun working directory (e.g. /tmp/zeroize-audit-{run_id}/)
repo_rootRepository root path
cargo_manifestAbsolute path to Cargo.toml
rust_crate_rootDirectory containing Cargo.toml (i.e. dirname(cargo_manifest))
rust_tu_hashShort hash identifying this crate (e.g. a1b2c3d4)
configMerged config object (sensitive patterns, approved wipes)
baseDirPlugin base directory (for tool paths)

Process

Step 1 — Generate Rustdoc JSON

Generate the rustdoc JSON file for the crate. This provides trait implementation data, derive macros, and type information needed for semantic analysis.

cargo +nightly rustdoc \
  --manifest-path <cargo_manifest> \
  --document-private-items -- \
  -Z unstable-options --output-format json

The output is written to <rust_crate_root>/target/doc/<crate_name>.json. Find it with:

find <rust_crate_root>/target/doc -name "*.json" -not -name "search-index*.json" | head -1

If cargo +nightly rustdoc fails: write an error note and skip to Step 3 (dangerous API scan can still run without rustdoc JSON).

Step 2 — Semantic Audit (Rustdoc JSON)

Run the trait-aware semantic auditor:

uv run {baseDir}/tools/scripts/semantic_audit.py \
  --rustdoc <rustdoc_json_path> \
  --cargo-toml <cargo_manifest> \
  --out {workdir}/source-analysis/rust-semantic-findings.json

This detects:

  • #[derive(Copy)] on sensitive types → SECRET_COPY (critical)
  • No Zeroize/ZeroizeOnDrop/Drop → MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE (high)
  • Zeroize without auto-trigger → MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE (high)
  • Partial Drop impl → PARTIAL_WIPE (high)
  • ZeroizeOnDrop with heap fields → PARTIAL_WIPE (medium)
  • Clone on zeroizing type → SECRET_COPY (medium)
  • From/Into returning non-zeroizing type → SECRET_COPY (medium)
  • Source file containing ptr::write_bytes and no compiler_fence(...) call → OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE (medium, needs_review)
  • #[cfg(feature=...)] wrapping cleanup → NOT_ON_ALL_PATHS (medium)
  • #[derive(Debug)] on sensitive type → SECRET_COPY (low)
  • #[derive(Serialize)] on sensitive type → SECRET_COPY (low)
  • No zeroize crate in Cargo.toml → MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE (low)

Section A of {baseDir}/references/rust-zeroization-patterns.md documents most of these as A1–A12, each with a minimal reproducing snippet and the recommended fix. Read the entry for a pattern before writing its finding detail, and use its snippet to judge how closely the flagged type matches.

Never drop or downgrade a finding because it reads as a poor match for the entry. A weak match is a needs_review finding whose evidence says how the code differs from the entry, not an omission: Step 5 combines both arrays in full, and a finding left out here is unrecoverable from any artifact the run produces.

The mapping is not one-to-one. The missing-zeroize-dependency check has no Section A entry, and A6 (a ManuallyDrop<T> struct field) covers a pattern the list above does not name. Where a check has no entry, write the detail and the fix from that check's own output — borrowing a neighbouring entry's snippet produces a finding that describes the wrong flaw.

If the script is missing or fails: write a status-bearing error object to the output file and continue:

{
  "status": "error",
  "error_type": "script_failed",
  "step": "semantic_audit",
  "message": "<stderr or missing-script reason>",
  "findings": []
}

Step 3 — Dangerous API Scan

Run the token/grep-based scanner across all .rs source files:

uv run {baseDir}/tools/scripts/find_dangerous_apis.py \
  --src <rust_crate_root>/src \
  --out {workdir}/source-analysis/rust-dangerous-api-findings.json

This detects:

  • mem::forget → MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE (critical)
  • ManuallyDrop::new → MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE (critical)
  • Box::leak → MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE (critical)
  • mem::uninitialized → MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE (critical)
  • Box::into_raw → MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE (high)
  • ptr::write_bytes → OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE (high)
  • mem::transmute → SECRET_COPY (high)
  • slice::from_raw_parts → SECRET_COPY (medium)
  • mem::take → MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE (medium)
  • async fn with secret-named local + .await → NOT_ON_ALL_PATHS (high)

Section B of {baseDir}/references/rust-zeroization-patterns.md covers these as B1–B10. Each entry explains why the API defeats zeroization, which matters here because this scanner is token-based: it cannot tell mem::take used to steal a secret from mem::take used on an unrelated buffer.

Findings without sensitive names in ±15 surrounding lines are downgraded to needs_review.

If the script is missing or fails: write a status-bearing error object to the output file and continue:

{
  "status": "error",
  "error_type": "script_failed",
  "step": "dangerous_api_scan",
  "message": "<stderr or missing-script reason>",
  "findings": []
}

Step 4 — Build Sensitive Objects List

From the rustdoc JSON analysis, extract all sensitive types into the shared sensitive-objects.json. Read the existing file first (C/C++ objects may already be present) to determine the next available ID.

ID offset: Use SO-5000 as the starting ID for Rust objects to avoid collisions with C/C++ SO-NNNN IDs (which start at SO-0001).

Each sensitive object entry:

{
  "id": "SO-5001",
  "language": "rust",
  "name": "HmacKey",
  "kind": "struct",
  "file": "src/crypto.rs",
  "line": 12,
  "confidence": "high",
  "heuristic": "sensitive_name_match",
  "has_wipe": false,
  "wipe_api": null,
  "related_findings": []
}

Append Rust entries to {workdir}/source-analysis/sensitive-objects.json. Create the file with [] if it does not exist.

Step 5 — Merge Source Findings

Combine both finding arrays from Steps 2 and 3 into source-findings.json. Assign F-RUST-SRC-NNNN IDs (sequential, starting at 0001).

Each finding must include:

{
  "id": "F-RUST-SRC-0001",
  "language": "rust",
  "category": "SECRET_COPY",
  "severity": "critical",
  "confidence": "likely",
  "file": "src/crypto.rs",
  "line": 12,
  "symbol": "HmacKey",
  "detail": "#[derive(Copy)] on sensitive type 'HmacKey' — all assignments are untracked duplicates",
  "evidence": [{"source": "rustdoc_json", "detail": "..."}],
  "related_objects": ["SO-5001"],
  "related_findings": [],
  "evidence_files": []
}

Append Rust findings to {workdir}/source-analysis/source-findings.json. Create with [] if the file does not exist.

Step 6 — Update TU Map

Add the Rust crate entry to {workdir}/source-analysis/tu-map.json. Only add if at least one sensitive Rust object was found (otherwise no compiler-level analysis is needed).

{ "<cargo_manifest_path>": "<rust_tu_hash>" }

Read the existing tu-map.json first and merge; do not overwrite existing C/C++ entries.

Output

Write all output files to {workdir}/source-analysis/:

FileContent
sensitive-objects.jsonAppended Rust entries with SO-5000+ IDs
source-findings.jsonAppended Rust findings with F-RUST-SRC-NNNN IDs
tu-map.jsonUpdated with {"<cargo_manifest>": "<rust_tu_hash>"} if sensitive objects found
rust-semantic-findings.jsonIntermediate output from semantic_audit.py (raw findings array or status-bearing error object)
rust-dangerous-api-findings.jsonIntermediate output from find_dangerous_apis.py (raw findings array or status-bearing error object)
rust-notes.mdSummary: steps executed, finding counts by category, skipped steps and reasons

Finding ID Convention

EntityPatternExample
Rust sensitive objectSO-5000+SO-5001, SO-5002
Rust source findingF-RUST-SRC-NNNNF-RUST-SRC-0001

Sequential numbering within this agent run. Zero-padded to 4 digits.

Error Handling

  • rustdoc JSON generation fails: Write error to rust-notes.md, skip Step 2, continue with Step 3.
  • semantic_audit.py missing or fails: Write status-bearing error object to rust-semantic-findings.json, continue.
  • find_dangerous_apis.py missing or fails: Write status-bearing error object to rust-dangerous-api-findings.json, continue.
  • Both scripts fail: No Rust source findings. Write status-bearing error notes in both intermediate files and record source-analysis-partial-failure in rust-notes.md.
  • Always write sensitive-objects.json (even if unchanged from C/C++ run) and tu-map.json.
  • If the shared files (sensitive-objects.json, source-findings.json, tu-map.json) are missing, create them from scratch.

Categories Produced

CategorySeveritySource
MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZEmedium–criticalSteps 2 + 3
SECRET_COPYlow–criticalSteps 2 + 3
PARTIAL_WIPEmedium–highStep 2
NOT_ON_ALL_PATHSmedium–highSteps 2 + 3
OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZEmedium–highStep 2 (flag at source; confirmed at IR in rust-compiler-analyzer)

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