cosmos-vulnerability-scanner
Scans Cosmos SDK blockchain modules and CosmWasm contracts for consensus-critical vulnerabilities — chain halts, fund loss, state divergence. 25 core + 16 IBC + 10 EVM + 3 CosmWasm patterns. Use when auditing custom x/ modules, reviewing IBC integrations, or assessing pre-launch chain security. Upda
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Security scan
Scan passedNo risky patterns were found in the scanned files.
Content sha256 5ad129500e1f9a9f… — run codexguild_scan_skills after installing to verify your local copy.
Static analysis is a first line of defense, not a guarantee. Read the source
SKILL.md
Cosmos Vulnerability Scanner
Purpose
Scan Cosmos SDK modules and CosmWasm contracts for vulnerabilities that cause chain halts, consensus failures, or fund loss. Spawns parallel scanning agents — each specializing in a vulnerability category — that return findings to the main skill, which then writes them as individual markdown files to an output directory.
Output directory: defaults to .bughunt_cosmos/. If the user specifies a different directory in their prompt, use that instead.
When to Use
- Auditing Cosmos SDK modules (custom
x/modules) - Reviewing CosmWasm smart contracts
- Pre-launch security assessment of Cosmos chains
- Investigating chain halt incidents
When NOT to Use
- Pure Solidity/EVM audits without Cosmos SDK — use Solidity-specific tools
- CometBFT consensus engine internals — this covers SDK modules, not the consensus layer itself
- General Go code review with no blockchain context
- Cosmos SDK application logic that is not consensus-critical (e.g., CLI commands, REST endpoints)
- CosmWasm contract-only audits on chains without custom SDK modules — use the CosmWasm checklist items alone
Essential Principles
- Consensus path is king — A bug only matters for chain halt/fund loss if it's on the consensus-critical execution path (BeginBlock, EndBlock, FinalizeBlock, msg_server handlers, AnteHandler). Always verify a finding is reachable from consensus before reporting it.
- State divergence = chain halt — Any non-determinism that causes validators to compute different state roots will halt the chain. This is the highest-severity class because it affects all validators simultaneously.
- Check the version — Cosmos SDK has breaking changes across major versions (v0.47 removed GetSigners, v0.50 added ABCI 2.0, v0.53 deprecated ValidateBasic). Always check
go.modversions before applying patterns. - False positives waste audit time — A map iteration in a CLI command is not a consensus bug. A panic in a query handler does not halt the chain. Verify the execution context before flagging.
- Cross-module interactions are where bugs hide — The most severe findings (IBC reentrancy, EVM/Cosmos state desync, authz escalation) involve interactions between modules, not bugs within a single module.
Scanning Workflow
Phase 1: Discovery (synchronous)
Entry: Target codebase path provided by user. Codebase contains Go source (e.g., x/ modules, go.mod) or Rust contracts with cosmwasm_std.
Run a synchronous subagent (Agent tool) with the full contents of DISCOVERY.md as its prompt. The agent must:
- Follow the Discovery workflow to explore the target codebase
- Return the full CLAUDE.md content (the technical inventory and threat model) in its response
- Return a structured summary with exactly these fields:
PLATFORM: pure-cosmos | evm | wasm (pick one; if multiple, comma-separated)
IBC_ENABLED: true | false
SDK_VERSION: <version from go.mod>
IBC_GO_VERSION: <version from go.mod, or "n/a">
CUSTOM_MODULES: <comma-separated list of x/* modules>
After the subagent returns, you (the main skill) Write the CLAUDE.md to the target repo root. Save its path and the discovery values — these feed into Phase 2.
Exit: CLAUDE.md written by main skill. PLATFORM, IBC_ENABLED, SDK_VERSION, IBC_GO_VERSION, and CUSTOM_MODULES captured.
Phase 2: Parallel Vulnerability Scan
Spawn scanning agents in a single message for maximum parallelism. Use the Agent Prompt Template below, filling in the reference file for each agent. Subagents only need read access (Grep, Glob, Read) — they return findings in their response and the main skill writes the files.
Always spawn these 3 agents:
| Agent Name | Reference File | Scope |
|---|---|---|
core-scanner | VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md | §1-9: non-determinism, ABCI, signers, validation, handlers, ante security |
state-scanner | STATE_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md | §11-23: bookkeeping, bank, pagination, events, tx replay, governance, arithmetic, encoding, deprecated modules |
advanced-scanner | ADVANCED_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md | §24-27: storage keys, consensus validation, circuit breaker, crypto |
Spawn conditionally (in the same parallel message):
| Agent Name | Condition | Reference File |
|---|---|---|
evm-scanner | PLATFORM includes evm | EVM_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md |
ibc-scanner | IBC_ENABLED is true | IBC_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md |
cosmwasm-scanner | PLATFORM includes wasm | COSMWASM_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md |
Agent Prompt Template
Construct each agent's prompt by replacing {REFERENCE_FILE_PATH} with the full path to the reference file (under {baseDir}/resources/) and {CLAUDE_MD_PATH} with the path to the CLAUDE.md written in Phase 1:
Perform a very thorough security scan of a Cosmos SDK codebase for specific vulnerability patterns.
CONTEXT:
Read {CLAUDE_MD_PATH} for codebase context (SDK version, modules, threat model, key files).
PATTERNS:
Read {REFERENCE_FILE_PATH} — it contains numbered vulnerability patterns. For EACH pattern:
1. Read the detection patterns and "What to Check" items
2. Use Grep and Glob to search the target codebase for each pattern
3. When a match is found, Read surrounding code to verify it's on a consensus-critical path (BeginBlock, EndBlock, FinalizeBlock, msg_server handlers, AnteHandler)
4. Classify severity per the guidelines below
RULES:
- Consensus path only: Only flag code reachable from consensus-critical execution. CLI/query/test code is NOT a finding.
- Check SDK version in go.mod before applying patterns (v0.47 removed GetSigners, v0.50 added ABCI 2.0, v0.53 deprecated ValidateBasic).
- Always use the Grep tool for searches, not bash grep. The reference file contains search patterns — use them directly with the Grep tool.
- Ignore cross-references to other resource files (e.g., links to IBC or COSMWASM patterns). Those patterns are covered by other scanning agents.
- Reject these rationalizations:
- "ValidateBasic catches this" — deprecated and facultative since SDK v0.53
- "Behind governance, so safe" — governance proposals can be malicious
- "IBC counterparty is trusted" — any chain can open a channel
- "Panic can't happen, input is validated" — trace the full call chain
- "Rounding error is only a few tokens" — compounds over time, can be looped
- "EVM precompile handles rollback" — many have incomplete rollback
SEVERITY:
- Critical (fund loss): signer mismatch, broken bookkeeping, AnteHandler bypass, bank keeper misuse, IBC token inflation, EVM/Cosmos desync, Merkle proof forgery, arithmetic overflow
- High (chain halt): non-determinism, ABCI panics, slow ABCI, non-deterministic IBC acks, consensus gaps, CacheContext event leak
- Medium (DoS): unbounded pagination, tx replay, missing validation, governance spam, rate limiting, circuit breaker bypass, storage key collisions
- Low (logic): rounding errors, stub handlers, event override, module ordering
OUTPUT — RETURN FORMAT:
Do NOT write any files. Return ALL findings and the summary in your response.
For each pattern, return one of:
§NUM PATTERN_NAME: Not applicable — [one-line reason]
§NUM PATTERN_NAME: FINDING (followed by the finding block below)
For each finding, include the full content using this template:
FINDING_FILE: {SEVERITY}-s{SECTION_NUM}-{kebab-description}.md
## [SEVERITY] Title
**Location**: `file:line`
**Description**: What the bug is and why it matters
**Vulnerable Code**: [snippet]
**Attack Scenario**: [numbered steps]
**Recommendation**: How to fix
**References**: [links to relevant advisories or building-secure-contracts]
You MUST report on ALL patterns in the reference file — do not skip any.
Exit: All scanning agents returned. Each reported on every pattern in their reference file.
Phase 3: Write Findings
After all scanning agents return, write finding files to the output directory (default .bughunt_cosmos/):
- Parse each agent's response for
FINDING_FILE:blocks - For each finding, Write the content to
{OUTPUT_DIR}/{filename}using the filename fromFINDING_FILE: - Create the output directory first if it doesn't exist
Phase 4: Verify Completeness
After writing all findings, verify every pattern was assessed:
- Collect the summary lines (§NUM entries) returned by each agent
- Check pattern counts against expected totals:
core-scanner: 8 patterns (§1-9, excluding §8 legacy-only)state-scanner: 13 patterns (§11-23)advanced-scanner: 4 patterns (§24-27)evm-scanner(if spawned): 10 patterns (§1-10)ibc-scanner(if spawned): 16 patterns (§1-16)cosmwasm-scanner(if spawned): 3 patterns (§1-3)
- If any pattern is missing from a summary, flag it and re-prompt that agent
- List all finding files written to the output directory with a
Globfor*.md
Exit: All patterns accounted for. Finding files listed for the user.
Success Criteria
- Discovery CLAUDE.md written with complete technical inventory and threat model
- All scanning agents completed and reported on every pattern in their reference file
- Pattern counts verified against expected totals (no patterns skipped)
- All findings written to output directory as individual markdown files
- Each finding file includes: severity, location, vulnerable code, attack scenario, recommendation
Resources
- Discovery & CLAUDE.md: DISCOVERY.md
- Core patterns (§1-9): VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
- State & module patterns (§11-23): STATE_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
- Advanced patterns (§24-27): ADVANCED_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
- IBC vulnerabilities: IBC_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
- CosmWasm vulnerabilities: COSMWASM_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
- EVM vulnerabilities: EVM_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
- Building Secure Contracts:
building-secure-contracts/not-so-smart-contracts/cosmos/ - Cosmos SDK Docs: https://docs.cosmos.network/
- CodeQL for Cosmos SDK: https://github.com/crypto-com/cosmos-sdk-codeql
Files
10- CHANGELOG.md
fd4ca29cf712.6 KB - SKILL.md
5f12f1ecdc10.7 KB - agents/openai.yaml
2c7ed00b8e256 B - resources/ADVANCED_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
c5d858206112.5 KB - resources/COSMWASM_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
9df45b35b97.5 KB - resources/DISCOVERY.md
33f3d3c7cc2.9 KB - resources/EVM_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
eb0388594418.0 KB - resources/IBC_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
3462dcadf127.5 KB - resources/STATE_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
323863a7d629.2 KB - resources/VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
e8fa593eab26.4 KB
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