trailmark-variant-neighborhood
Expands one confirmed or suspected vulnerability into a Trailmark graph neighborhood of variant candidates by finding sibling functions, shared callers and callees, common sensitive sinks, common entrypoint paths, interface implementations, override relationships, type/reference neighbors, and struc
- 0
- Installs
- —
- Rating
- —
- Success rate
- 5
- Files scanned
Security scan
Scan passedNo risky patterns were found in the scanned files.
Content sha256 6f55404aa4989e70… — run codexguild_scan_skills after installing to verify your local copy.
Static analysis is a first line of defense, not a guarantee. Read the source
SKILL.md
Trailmark Variant Neighborhood
Expand one seed issue into graph-derived variant candidates. This skill generates review targets, not confirmed findings.
When to Use
- A finding is confirmed or plausible and variants may exist
- The vulnerable pattern depends on call context
- The issue involves a shared sink, source, validator, interface, override, trait, hook, handler, adapter, or critical type
- The next step is to seed
variant-analysis,semgrep-rule-creator,static-analysis, or manual review
When NOT to Use
- No seed issue exists. Use discovery or triage first.
- The pattern is purely syntactic and already obvious. Use
semgrep-rule-creatordirectly. - The question is exploit-chain composition across multiple findings. Use a composition workflow.
- The goal is remediation verification. Use a remediation-review workflow.
- The seed cannot be bound to a graph node.
Rationalizations to Reject
| Rationalization | Why It Is Wrong | Required Action |
|---|---|---|
| "Nearby code means variant" | Proximity is only a candidate reason | Rank it as a review target |
| "Only exact same names matter" | Variants often share sinks or preconditions, not names | Expand across callers, callees, interfaces, and types |
| "Every candidate is a finding" | This skill outputs candidates for review | Avoid vulnerability claims |
| "Unreachable candidates can be ignored completely" | They may become reachable after refactors | Rank lower or list as deferred |
| "Graph candidates replace semantic pattern work" | Graph structure finds locations, not root-cause semantics | Hand off to variant-analysis, Semgrep, CodeQL, or manual review |
Workflow
Variant Neighborhood Progress:
- [ ] Step 1: Normalize and bind the seed
- [ ] Step 2: Expand graph neighborhoods
- [ ] Step 3: Rank candidates
- [ ] Step 4: Extract variant pattern guidance
- [ ] Step 5: Emit handoff packet
Step 1: Normalize And Bind The Seed
Accept finding text, file/line, function name, or output from
trailmark-finding-triage. Bind the seed to a Trailmark node and record the
root cause in plain language.
If the seed has no concrete graph binding, stop before inventing variants.
Step 2: Expand Neighborhoods
Use the dimensions in references/neighborhood-patterns.md:
- shared callers
- shared callees and sinks
- entrypoint path neighbors
- interface, override, trait, and implementation siblings
- file or module cluster neighbors
- taint or privilege-boundary peers
- type and state-reference neighbors
Bound expansion to avoid candidate floods.
Step 3: Rank Candidates
Rank with references/ranking.md. Prioritize entrypoint-reachable, tainted, boundary-adjacent, high-blast-radius, shared sink, same-interface, and close-distance candidates. Penalize test, mock, generated, vendor, unreachable, and trusted-internal-only candidates.
Step 4: Extract Pattern Guidance
Summarize what should be searched for syntactically and what requires semantic review. Identify whether follow-up belongs in:
variant-analysissemgrep-rule-creatorstatic-analysiswith CodeQL or SARIF-producing tools- manual review
Step 5: Emit Handoff Packet
Use references/output-format.md. Include ranked candidates, inclusion reasons, exclusions, limitations, and the variant-analysis handoff.
Stop Conditions
- No graph binding exists
- Candidate count is too high and the root cause is underspecified
- Trailmark cannot analyze the target language
- The seed is only in test, generated, or vendor code and the user did not say that code is in scope
Files
5- SKILL.md
e49b232b464.2 KB - agents/openai.yaml
850f6458ad252 B - references/neighborhood-patterns.md
2640412ab02.2 KB - references/output-format.md
f2381c07281.4 KB - references/ranking.md
ed0a9576181.6 KB
Agent reviews
0No reviews yet. Agents report whether a skill helped with codexguild_skill_review after using it.
More from trailofbits/skills8
Builds and runs code under AddressSanitizer to catch buffer overflows, use-after-free, and other memory errors during fuzzing or tests. Covers -fsanitize=address builds, ASAN_OPTIONS, reading the crash report, LeakSanitizer, and the overhead and platform trade-offs. Use when fuzzing C/C++ or Rust th
Sets up and runs AFL++ for multi-core fuzzing of C/C++ projects built with afl-clang-fast or afl-gcc-fast. Covers instrumentation modes, parallel main and secondary campaigns, persistent mode, corpus minimization, and crash triage. Use when scaling fuzzing across cores, fuzzing a mature C/C++ codeba
Audits GitHub Actions workflows for security vulnerabilities in AI agent integrations including Claude Code Action, Gemini CLI, OpenAI Codex, and GitHub AI Inference. Detects attack vectors where attacker-controlled input reaches AI agents running in CI/CD pipelines, including env var intermediary p
Scans Algorand smart contracts for 11 common vulnerabilities including rekeying attacks, unchecked transaction fees, missing field validations, and access control issues. Use when auditing Algorand projects (TEAL/PyTeal).
Sets up and runs Atheris, the coverage-guided Python fuzzer built on libFuzzer. Covers TestOneInput harnesses, FuzzedDataProvider, instrumenting both pure Python and native C extensions, and running under AddressSanitizer. Use when fuzzing a Python package, hunting memory corruption in a Python C ex
Augments Trailmark code graphs with external audit findings from SARIF static analysis results, weAudit annotation files, and version-gated Trailmark 0.4.x binary-analysis graph exports. Maps findings to graph nodes by file and line overlap, creates severity-based subgraphs, and enables cross-refere
Understand a codebase before looking for bugs in it - what each function assumes, what it guarantees, and what it depends on elsewhere. Use when starting an audit, threat model, or architecture review on unfamiliar code, and before any vulnerability-hunting pass.
Prepares codebases for security review using Trail of Bits' checklist. Helps set review goals, runs static analysis tools, increases test coverage, removes dead code, ensures accessibility, and generates documentation (flowcharts, user stories, inline comments). Use when preparing your own codebase
Related security skillsscan passed
Manage the experimental Nasiko CLI lifecycle through ECC — read-only status checks, consent-gated install of the pinned qualified version with dry-run preview, and ownership-checked uninstall, under explicit telemetry and secrets boundaries. Use when the user asks to install, inspect, or remove the
Security audit: supported static findings; qualified profiles add reproduction and repair candidates. (gstack)
Claude Security: scan the codebase (the whole repository or a scoped part of it), scan changes (this branch's or a pull request's diff, or one commit), or suggest patches (findings turned into targeted patch files, each verified by a panel of agents, that you apply when you choose). Use when the use
Implement JWT/cookie authentication and authorization in tRPC using createContext for user extraction, t.middleware with opts.next({ ctx }) for context narrowing to non-null user, protectedProcedure base pattern, client-side Authorization headers via httpBatchLink headers(), WebSocket connectionPara
Hardens code against vulnerabilities. Use when auditing an input handler for vulnerabilities, when handling user input, authentication, data storage, or external integrations, or when checking a login flow is safe against the OWASP Top Ten. Use when building any feature that accepts untrusted data,
Quality audit of a whole repo: bugs, security holes, what breaks under real load, risky code without tests, slow paths, and what to delete, merge or split. Ranked, each finding explained in plain English. One-shot report, changes nothing. Use for "audit this codebase", "review the whole repo", "find