hackerone
HackerOne bug bounty automation - parses scope CSVs, deploys parallel pentesting agents per asset, validates PoCs, and generates platform-ready submission reports.
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Content sha256 4d908a0d7ab5a117… — run codexguild_scan_skills after installing to verify your local copy.
Static analysis is a first line of defense, not a guarantee. Read the source
SKILL.md
HackerOne Bug Bounty
Automates: scope parsing → parallel testing per asset → authoritative finding validation → submission reports.
Quick start
- Input: HackerOne program URL or scope CSV.
- Parse scope and program guidelines.
- Spawn one coordinator per eligible asset (parallel).
- Each coordinator runs the standard engagement flow (see
skills/coordination/SKILL.md). - Run the
validate-findingsworkflow per asset (authoritative submission gate). Generate HackerOne reports from the validated set ONLY — never submit a finding that is notVALID/REPAIRED.
Scope CSV format
Expected columns:
identifier— asset URL/domain.asset_type— URL, WILDCARD, API, CIDR.eligible_for_submission— must betrue.max_severity— critical / high / medium / low.instruction— asset-specific notes.
Parse with skills/hackerone/tools/csv_parser.py. Filter for eligible_for_submission=true.
Agent deployment
One coordinator per asset, spawned in parallel:
coordinator_role = Read("skills/coordination/SKILL.md")
Agent(prompt=f"{coordinator_role}\n\nTARGET: {asset_url}\nSCOPE: {program_guidelines}\nOUTPUT_DIR: ...",
run_in_background=True)
10 assets → 10 parallel coordinators (~2-4 h vs 20-40 h sequential). Each coordinator follows skills/coordination/SKILL.md and reference/role-matrix.md.
Finding validation (authoritative submission gate)
Every finding requires poc.py (executable exploit), poc_output.txt (timestamped execution proof), manual repro steps, and evidence (screenshots / HTTP captures / video). This is the input the validator consumes.
After each asset's coordinator returns, the orchestrator runs the validate-findings workflow for that asset and submits ONLY findings it marks VALID or REPAIRED:
v = Workflow(name="validate-findings", args={
"output_dir": asset_output_dir, # the coordinator's OUTPUT_DIR
"target": asset_url,
"business_tier": "revenue", # production/external bug-bounty scope; else "unknown"
"votes": 3, # adversarial refuters per finding (bounty = stricter)
"repair": True, # regenerate broken/absent PoCs so each finding has a runnable evidence script
"strict": True, # one failed gate => REJECTED
})
# v.counts -> {total, valid, repaired, rejected}; v.validated[] / v.rejected[]
# Verdicts at {asset_output_dir}/artifacts/validated/{id}.json (+ false-positives/).
# Asset report at {asset_output_dir}/reports/validation-report.md.
validate-findings is the authoritative gate because it directly preempts the most common HackerOne rejections: it verifies each CVE against NVD + a recomputed CVSS base score (from the vector) + CISA KEV + the vendor advisory, runs (and repairs) every PoC until it emits the evidence that proves the issue, recomputes the risk/severity, corroborates every claim against raw evidence, and kills false positives via adversarial refutation.
The orchestrator is the only layer that runs this workflow (it is top-level; the workflow is one level below — legal nesting). To avoid double work, coordinators may treat their interleaved per-finding validators (run the instant each candidate is materialized) as a provisional self-check; the standalone validate-findings verdict is authoritative for submission. A REJECTED finding is a false positive — it never enters a submission, an appendix, or a count; its artifacts/false-positives/{id}.json is the sole record. Likewise a coordinator-dropped candidate (uncured DEMOTED, in artifacts/dropped/) is never submitted.
The HackerOne PoC contract is a superset of the standard finding contract (skills/coordination/reference/validator-role.md).
Submission report format
Build each report from a validated finding only. Required sections per HackerOne standard:
- Summary (2-3 sentences).
- Severity (CVSS + business impact; v4.0 primary, v3.1 → v3.0 → v2.0 fallback) — use the score
validate-findingsrecomputed from the vector and the risk bucket it assigned, not a hand-typed number. - Steps to Reproduce (numbered, clear) — mirror the validated
verification-script.py. - Visual Evidence (from
evidence/validation/). - Impact (realistic attack scenario).
- Remediation (actionable fixes).
Validate report format with skills/hackerone/tools/report_validator.py (complements the finding validation).
Output structure
Standard OUTPUT_DIR (skills/coordination/reference/output-discipline.md) plus a per-asset reports/submissions/ containing the platform-ready markdown. validate-findings writes the verdicts under artifacts/validated|false-positives/ and the asset reports/validation-report.md.
{OUTPUT_DIR}/
├── findings/
│ └── finding-NNN/evidence/validation/ # validate-findings proof packages
├── reports/
│ ├── submissions/ # built ONLY from artifacts/validated/
│ │ ├── H1_CRITICAL_001.md
│ │ └── H1_HIGH_001.md
│ ├── validation-report.md # validate-findings asset report
│ └── SUBMISSION_GUIDE.md
├── recon/
├── logs/
└── artifacts/
├── validated/ # {id}.json — submit these
└── false-positives/ # {id}.json — never submit these
Program selection
High-value: new programs (< 30 days), fast response (< 24 h), high bounties, large attack surface. Avoid: slow response (> 1 week), low bounties, restrictive scope.
Submission checklist
-
validate-findingsverdict =VALIDorREPAIRED(artifacts/validated/{id}.jsonexists). Never submit aREJECTEDfinding. - CVSS recomputed from the vector (v4.0 primary; v3.1 → v3.0 → v2.0 fallback) and matching NVD when a CVE applies (
evidence/validation/cve-verification.md). - Working PoC with
poc_output.txt(the validator re-ran/repaired it and confirmed the evidence token). - Step-by-step reproduction.
- Visual evidence.
- Realistic impact (risk score/bucket from
evidence/validation/risk-assessment.md). - Remediation guidance.
- Sensitive data sanitized.
- Asset is
eligible_for_submission=true.
Common rejections (preempt)
| Rejection | Prevention |
|---|---|
| Out of Scope | Verify eligible_for_submission=true and asset-type match |
| Cannot Reproduce | validate-findings re-runs (and repairs) the PoC 3× and requires a vuln-class evidence token — only reproducible findings pass the gate |
| Duplicate | Search disclosed reports before submission; submit quickly |
| Insufficient Impact | Document realistic attack scenario; validate-findings recomputes risk/severity so the rating is defensible |
| Incorrect severity / CVSS | validate-findings recomputes the base score from the vector and cross-checks NVD + KEV; any mismatch is flagged before you submit |
Tools
skills/hackerone/tools/csv_parser.py— parse HackerOne scope CSVs.validate-findingsworkflow — authoritative per-asset finding validation (NVD/CVSS-math/KEV/exploit-run/repair/risk/adversarial). The submission gate; run once per asset.skills/hackerone/tools/report_validator.py— validate report format completeness (the 6 submission sections). Complementsvalidate-findings(which validates the finding); run it on each report built from a validated finding.skills/coordination/SKILL.md— coordinator scaffold.
Usage
/hackerone <program_url_or_csv_path>
Files
7- SKILL.md
4e2342f8e67.7 KB - reference/INTEGRATION_GUIDE.md
22a094427c7.3 KB - reference/sensitive-data-tracking.md
96a8635ef04.1 KB - tools/__init__.py
e3b0c442980 B - tools/csv_parser.py
8997caef9c5.2 KB - tools/report_validator.py
050ffae50f9.6 KB - tools/sensitive_data_tracker.py
297d8b80d015.3 KB
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