network-appliance-offensive
Offensive testing of perimeter network appliances and VPN crypto — IKE/IPsec (aggressive-mode, transform/DH enum, NAT-T), Check Point SIC/OPSEC, safe firmware/patch-level inference for FortiGate/PAN-OS/Cisco ASA/Citrix feeding CVE applicability, NTLM Type-2 target-info decode, handshake-completion T
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Static analysis is a first line of defense, not a guarantee. Read the source
SKILL.md
Network-Appliance Offensive
firewall-review audits a config statically; infrastructure covers generic ports/DNS/SMB. Neither tests a live perimeter appliance or its VPN crypto — so IKE builders, SIC/OPSEC fingerprinting, and TTL discriminators were reinvented from raw sockets each engagement, often shallowly, and CVE applicability was left UNDETERMINED across whole estates. This skill provides the deterministic, tested tools and the precondition-gated methodology. Non-destructive only — every tool observes/decodes/infers; none fires an exploit, and CVE applicability is a precondition check, never a blind "vulnerable."
Tools
| Tool | Does | Anti-footgun |
|---|---|---|
tools/ike_enum.py | IKEv1 aggressive-mode detection, IKEv1/IKEv2 transform + DH-group enum, NOTIFY / NAT-T decode (wraps ike-scan, raw ISAKMP SA_INIT builder fallback) | Aggressive-mode support (PSK-hash leak) is the finding; enumerate, don't crack in-band |
tools/checkpoint_sic_opsec.py | Fingerprint SIC (18190/1), OPSEC LEA/ELA (18183/4), CA (18192/18210), FW1 (256/264), Gaia Portal; emit a CVE-precondition map incl. CVE-2024-24919 | CVE-2024-24919 is applicable ONLY when the RA/Mobile-Access marker is observed — else undetermined |
tools/appliance_version_infer.py | Safe firmware/patch-level inference for FortiGate / PAN-OS / Cisco ASA / Citrix from headers, login markers, cert CN/serial → CVE applicability | Never asserts applicable on a low-confidence / unknown version — returns undetermined |
tools/tls_handshake_probe.py | Which TLS versions are supported, by completed handshake per pinned protocol | Fixes the openssl s_client exit/SECLEVEL false-positive — an aborted handshake ≠ support |
tools/ntlm_decode.py | Decode an NTLM Type-2 (CHALLENGE) AV_PAIR block → NetBIOS/DNS host, domain, forest, OS build | Info-leak finding from an unauthenticated challenge; no auth attempted |
tools/perimeter_forensics.py | RST-TTL forgery discriminator (real host vs firewall forging a RST) + IKE NOTIFY decode | Never asserts "internal host behind FW" on RSTs alone — a firewall forges RSTs indistinguishably at this layer; returns undetermined without an open-service TTL baseline |
Workflow
- Fingerprint the appliance — from the port set + banners + login markers, run
appliance_version_infer.py(vendor + version guess + confidence) and, for Check Point,checkpoint_sic_opsec.py. A version guess ofundetermined/low-confidence stays undetermined — do not score CVEs against it. - VPN crypto — on UDP 500/4500, run
ike_enum.py: flag IKEv1 aggressive mode (leaks the PSK hash → a finding), enumerate accepted transforms + weak DH groups (1/2/5), and decode NAT-T/NOTIFY. IKEv2-only where IKEv1 RA is absent (a CVE requiring IKEv1 aggressive mode isnot_applicablethere — seeseverity-calibration.mdrule 5). - TLS posture —
tls_handshake_probe.pyper host: report only handshake-completed versions; TLS 1.0/1.1 completion is the weak-protocol finding (not an openssl exit code). - Info leaks — decode any NTLM Type-2 challenge (
ntlm_decode.py) for internal host/domain/OS intel; record it as an information-disclosure finding. - CVE applicability (precondition-gated) — for each surfaced appliance CVE, take the vendor+version from step 1 and the precondition map (checkpoint_sic_opsec / appliance_version_infer
applicability) and markapplicable/undetermined/not_applicable. Enrich the CVE viapython3 tools/nvd-lookup.py. Anundeterminedapplicability is reported as such — never inflated to a confirmed vuln. - Forensics — if a "closed" host appears live behind the firewall, run
perimeter_forensics.py --classify-ttlsbefore asserting anything: distinguish a real host RST from a filter-forged RST (needs an open-service TTL baseline; otherwiseundetermined).
Anti-Patterns
- Do not score an appliance CVE as confirmed on a version banner alone — banners are backported/spoofable; gate on
applicability(severity-calibration.mdrules 4-5). - Do not claim TLS 1.0/1.1 support from an
openssl s_clientnon-zero exit — require a completed handshake (tls_handshake_probe.py). - Do not assert "internal host behind the firewall" from RSTs — a firewall forges RSTs; use the TTL discriminator and accept
undetermined. - Do not crack an IKE aggressive-mode PSK hash in-band on the engagement — capturing/flagging the aggressive-mode exposure is the finding; offline cracking needs explicit authorization.
Reference
- Static counterpart:
firewall-review(config audit). Generic network:infrastructure. - CVE precondition / applicability discipline:
../coordination/reference/severity-calibration.md(rules 4-5).
Files
1- SKILL.md
9237b33a1d5.7 KB
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