risk-prioritiser
Risk-based prioritisation of confirmed attack paths. Combines exploit feasibility, technical CVSS severity, and asset business impact into a single ranked list driving remediation roadmaps.
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SKILL.md
Risk Prioritiser
Consume the attack-path graph + the client-supplied business-tier map and emit a single ranked list of paths the org should remediate first. Mounted onto cloud-agent task #7.
Trigger
Cron daily after attack-path-stitcher (task #6) completes. Also event-fires when a new validated/*.json is written with nvd.score >= 9.0.
Workflow
- Load inputs.
artifacts/attack-paths.json— graph from task #6. Split intoconfirmed_paths(RFP-grade) andinferred_paths(topology/supply-chain).business-tier-map.csv— client-supplied asset → tier. Search order:{OUTPUT_DIR}/business-tier-map.csv→projects/rfp-3.3/schemas/business-tier-map.csv.
- Score each
confirmed_pathsentry.feasibility= product of every edge'sfeasibilityalong the path. For confirmed paths this is always 1.0.technical_severity=max_cvss_along_path / 10.business_impact= tier weight of the destination (crown_jewel = 1.0 by definition).entry_exposure= 1.0 if entry node isexternal: true, else 0.5.- Final score =
feasibility × technical_severity × business_impact × entry_exposure.
- Score each single-asset validated finding that does not sit on a confirmed path. Same formula;
feasibility = 1.0,business_impact= asset's own tier weight, hop count = 1. - Score each
inferred_pathsentry, but cap their bucket placement attheoreticalregardless of numeric score. Inferred paths NEVER reachimmediate/short_term/medium_term— RFP §3.3 requires "confirmed", and inferred paths are evidence-deficient by construction. - Sort descending. Stable tie-break order: max CVSS desc → hop count asc → finding age desc (newer first).
- Bucket into roadmap tiers.
immediate(0-7 days): confirmed AND score ≥ 0.6short_term(7-30 days): confirmed AND 0.3 ≤ score < 0.6medium_term(30-90 days): confirmed AND 0.1 ≤ score < 0.3monitor: confirmed AND score < 0.1theoretical(track-only): any path withpath_class != "confirmed". Surfaced in board reports but excluded from the remediation SLA roadmap.
- Write outputs to
artifacts/attack-paths-ranked.json+attack-paths-ranked.md. Each row carriespath_classso downstream consumers can filter.
Tier weights
| Tier | Weight |
|---|---|
crown_jewel | 1.00 |
revenue | 0.70 |
support | 0.40 |
dev | 0.20 |
unknown | 0.30 |
The unknown weight is deliberately above support to bias toward investigating un-mapped assets — they often turn out to be high-tier once discovered.
Output
{OUTPUT_DIR}/
artifacts/
attack-paths-ranked.json
attack-paths-ranked.md
attack-paths-ranked.json schema:
{
"generated_at": "2026-05-13T03:30:00Z",
"tier_weights_used": {"crown_jewel": 1.0, "revenue": 0.7, "support": 0.4, "dev": 0.2, "unknown": 0.3},
"ranked": [
{
"rank": 1,
"kind": "path",
"path_class": "confirmed",
"path_id": "asset05->asset42->asset99",
"hops": ["asset05", "asset42", "asset99"],
"feasibility": 1.0,
"max_cvss": 9.8,
"business_impact": 1.0,
"entry_exposure": 1.0,
"score": 0.98,
"bucket": "immediate",
"remediation_focus": "asset05"
},
{
"rank": 2,
"kind": "finding",
"path_class": "confirmed",
"finding_id": "finding-018",
"asset": "asset42",
"feasibility": 1.0,
"max_cvss": 9.1,
"business_impact": 0.7,
"entry_exposure": 1.0,
"score": 0.637,
"bucket": "immediate"
}
],
"buckets": {"immediate": 4, "short_term": 11, "medium_term": 22, "monitor": 8, "theoretical": 14}
}
Remediation focus
For each ranked path, pick a single remediation_focus asset — the one whose patch breaks the chain at the lowest cost:
- If any edge has feasibility < 1.0 → focus on that edge's source asset. The weakest pivot is the attacker's cheapest hop; hardening it eliminates the easiest entry.
- If every edge is feasibility 1.0 (fully confirmed chain) → focus on the path's entry asset (
hops[0]). Patching the externally-reachable foothold breaks every downstream hop and is the cheapest patch surface operationally.
This rule yields a single deterministic asset id per path. The previous "edge contribution formula" was deprecated — on uniformly-confirmed chains every edge has identical contribution, which gives no useful signal.
Rules
- Always derive from
attack-paths.json. Do not re-derive feasibility / CVSS — those are already validated by upstream tasks. business-tier-map.csvis authoritative. If an asset is missing from the map, useunknowntier weight + flagunmapped_assets[]at the top of the JSON output.- Stable rank for stable input. Re-running on identical input must produce byte-identical output.
- No new findings. Prioritisation never creates findings; it only re-orders.
- Bucket thresholds are config. The 0.6/0.3/0.1 cuts can be overridden via
--thresholdsargument when running on a client with different remediation cadences. Default values match the Transilience report's "Immediate / Short-term / Medium-term" labels.
Implementation
The scoring is implemented deterministically by tools/risk-prioritise.py (not delegated to an LLM agent), to satisfy Rule 3 (stable rank for stable input). The tool reads artifacts/attack-paths.json and writes the two output files. Override the tier weights or bucket thresholds with --tier-weights / --thresholds JSON arguments — recorded in the output for audit.
References
reference/scoring-formula.md— worked example + edge-case behaviour.projects/rfp-3.3/schemas/business-tier-map.csv— input schema and example rows.tools/risk-prioritise.py— deterministic implementation.
Files
2- SKILL.md
61ccb9b8aa6.0 KB - reference/scoring-formula.md
a62b45b09a3.7 KB
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