laravel-security
Laravel security best practices — authentication, authorization, Eloquent safety, CSRF, XSS prevention, API security, and secure deployment configurations. Use when reviewing Laravel auth, Eloquent safety, CSRF, XSS, API security, or deployment configuration.
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SKILL.md
Laravel Security Best Practices
Comprehensive security guidelines for Laravel applications to protect against common vulnerabilities.
When to Activate
- Setting up Laravel authentication and authorization (Sanctum, Passport, Jetstream, Breeze)
- Implementing user roles, permissions, and policies
- Configuring production security settings and environment variables
- Reviewing Laravel applications for security vulnerabilities
- Deploying Laravel applications to production
- Writing secure Eloquent queries and migrations
Production Configuration
Essential Production Settings
// config/app.php
'env' => env('APP_ENV', 'production'),
'debug' => (bool) env('APP_DEBUG', false), // CRITICAL: Never true in production
'key' => env('APP_KEY'), // Must be set: php artisan key:generate
// config/session.php
'secure' => env('SESSION_SECURE_COOKIE', true),
'http_only' => true,
'same_site' => 'lax',
// Verify APP_KEY is set at boot
// bootstrap/app.php or a service provider
if (empty(config('app.key'))) {
throw new RuntimeException('APP_KEY is not set. Run: php artisan key:generate');
}
Environment File Security
# NEVER commit .env to version control
# .gitignore already includes .env by default
# Use .env.example with placeholders instead
DB_PASSWORD=
APP_KEY=
SANCTUM_TOKEN_PREFIX=
# Validate required variables at boot
// In AppServiceProvider::boot()
$requiredKeys = ['app.key', 'database.connections.mysql.database', 'database.connections.mysql.username'];
foreach ($requiredKeys as $key) {
if (empty(config($key))) {
throw new RuntimeException("Missing required config key: {$key}");
}
}
HTTPS Enforcement
// AppServiceProvider::boot() or middleware
if (app()->environment('production')) {
URL::forceScheme('https');
request()->server->set('HTTPS', 'on');
}
// config/app.php for trusted proxies (load balancers)
// Use specific IP ranges — * trusts all, allowing X-Forwarded-* spoofing
// AWS: '10.0.0.0/8', '172.16.0.0/12', '192.168.0.0/16'
'trusted_proxies' => ['10.0.0.0/8', '172.16.0.0/12'],
// Force HTTPS in production via middleware
// app/Http/Middleware/ForceHttps.php
public function handle($request, Closure $next)
{
if (!$request->secure() && app()->environment('production')) {
return redirect()->secure($request->getRequestUri());
}
return $next($request);
}
Authentication
Sanctum (API Token Authentication)
// config/sanctum.php
'stateful' => explode(',', env('SANCTUM_STATEFUL_DOMAINS', sprintf(
'%s%s',
'localhost,localhost:3000,127.0.0.1,127.0.0.1:8000,::1',
env('APP_URL') ? ',' . parse_url(env('APP_URL'), PHP_URL_HOST) : ''
)));
'expiration' => 60 * 24, // Token expiration in minutes (null = never)
'token_prefix' => env('SANCTUM_TOKEN_PREFIX', ''),
// Issuing tokens with abilities
$token = $user->createToken('api-token', ['read', 'write'])->plainTextToken;
// Validate abilities on routes
Route::middleware('auth:sanctum')->group(function () {
Route::get('/orders', function () {
// User must have 'read' ability
abort_unless(Auth::user()->tokenCan('read'), 403);
// ...
})->middleware('abilities:read');
Route::post('/orders', function () {
// User must have 'write' ability
abort_unless(Auth::user()->tokenCan('write'), 403);
// ...
})->middleware('abilities:write');
});
Password Security
// config/hashing.php
// Default is bcrypt. Argon2id is stronger.
'bcrypt' => [
'rounds' => env('BCRYPT_ROUNDS', 12), // Increase for stronger hashing
],
'argon' => [
'memory' => 65536,
'threads' => 4,
'time' => 4,
],
// Password validation in RegisterRequest
public function rules(): array
{
return [
'password' => [
'required',
'confirmed',
Password::min(12)
->letters()
->mixedCase()
->numbers()
->symbols()
->uncompromised(), // Checks haveibeenpwned
],
];
}
// Rate limit login attempts
// App\Http\Controllers\Auth\AuthenticatedSessionController
protected function authenticated(Request $request, $user)
{
if ($user->wasRecentlyLockedOut()) {
// Notify user of suspicious login
$user->notify(new SuspiciousLoginNotification($request->ip()));
}
}
Session Management
// config/session.php
'driver' => env('SESSION_DRIVER', 'database'), // database/redis > file
'lifetime' => env('SESSION_LIFETIME', 120),
'expire_on_close' => env('SESSION_EXPIRE_ON_CLOSE', false),
'encrypt' => env('SESSION_ENCRYPT', false),
// Regenerate session on login
// App\Http\Controllers\Auth\AuthenticatedSessionController
public function store(LoginRequest $request): RedirectResponse
{
$request->authenticate();
$request->session()->regenerate(); // CRITICAL: prevents session fixation
return redirect()->intended(RouteServiceProvider::HOME);
}
// Invalidate session on logout
public function destroy(Request $request): RedirectResponse
{
Auth::guard('web')->logout();
$request->session()->invalidate();
$request->session()->regenerateToken();
return redirect('/');
}
Authorization
Gates
// App\Providers\AuthServiceProvider
use App\Models\Post;
use App\Models\User;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Gate;
public function boot(): void
{
Gate::define('update-post', function (User $user, Post $post): bool {
return $user->id === $post->user_id;
});
Gate::define('publish-post', function (User $user): bool {
return $user->role === 'editor' || $user->role === 'admin';
});
// Using before() for super-admin override
Gate::before(function (User $user, string $ability): ?bool {
if ($user->role === 'super-admin') {
return true; // Grants all abilities
}
return null; // Fall through to normal checks
});
}
// Usage in controllers
public function update(Request $request, Post $post): RedirectResponse
{
Gate::authorize('update-post', $post);
// Or: $this->authorize('update-post', $post);
// Or: abort_unless(Auth::user()->can('update-post', $post), 403);
// ...
}
Policies
// App\Policies\PostPolicy
class PostPolicy
{
use HandlesAuthorization;
public function viewAny(?User $user): bool
{
return true; // Public listing
}
public function view(?User $user, Post $post): bool
{
return $post->is_published || ($user && $user->id === $post->user_id);
}
public function create(User $user): bool
{
return $user->hasVerifiedEmail(); // Must verify email first
}
public function update(User $user, Post $post): bool
{
return $user->id === $post->user_id;
}
public function delete(User $user, Post $post): bool
{
return $user->id === $post->user_id && $post->created_at->diffInDays(now()) <= 30;
}
public function restore(User $user, Post $post): bool
{
return $user->role === 'admin';
}
public function forceDelete(User $user, Post $post): bool
{
return $user->role === 'super-admin';
}
}
// Register in AuthServiceProvider
protected $policies = [
Post::class => PostPolicy::class,
];
// Controller usage
public function show(Post $post): View
{
$this->authorize('view', $post);
return view('posts.show', compact('post'));
}
// Blade usage
@can('update', $post)
<a href="{{ route('posts.edit', $post) }}">Edit</a>
@endcan
@cannot('update', $post)
<span>You cannot edit this post</span>
@endcannot
Middleware Authorization
// Using middleware in routes
Route::put('/posts/{post}', [PostController::class, 'update'])
->middleware('can:update,post');
Route::get('/posts/create', [PostController::class, 'create'])
->middleware('can:create,App\Models\Post');
// Custom authorization middleware
// app/Http/Middleware/CheckRole.php
class CheckRole
{
public function handle(Request $request, Closure $next, string $role): mixed
{
if (!$request->user() || $request->user()->role !== $role) {
abort(403, 'Unauthorized. This area requires role: ' . $role);
}
return $next($request);
}
}
// Register in Kernel
protected $routeMiddleware = [
'role' => \App\Http\Middleware\CheckRole::class,
];
// Route usage
Route::middleware(['auth', 'role:admin'])->group(function () {
Route::get('/admin', [AdminController::class, 'index']);
});
Eloquent Security
Mass Assignment Protection
// BAD: $guarded = [] allows ALL columns to be mass-assigned
// NEVER use $guarded = [] in production
// GOOD: Whitelist fillable attributes
final class User extends Authenticatable
{
protected $fillable = [
'name',
'email',
'phone',
'avatar',
];
// NEVER add 'role', 'is_admin', 'is_verified' here
}
// GOOD: Explicitly control which fields can be filled in requests
public function store(StoreUserRequest $request): RedirectResponse
{
$user = User::create($request->safe()->only([
'name', 'email', 'phone', 'avatar'
]));
// $request->safe() uses validated data only
// $request->only() is NOT safe on its own without validation rules
}
// BAD: Creating a user with request data directly
User::create($request->all()); // VULNERABLE to mass assignment!
// BETTER: Use DTOs for creation
$user = User::create($request->validated()); // Only validated fields
SQL Injection Prevention
// GOOD: Eloquent automatically parameterizes queries
User::where('email', $userInput)->first();
User::whereRaw('email = ?', [$userInput])->first();
// GOOD: Query Builder also parameterizes
DB::table('users')->where('email', $userInput)->first();
DB::select('SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ?', [$userInput]);
// BAD: Raw string interpolation
DB::select("SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = '{$userInput}'"); // VULNERABLE!
User::whereRaw("email = '{$userInput}'")->first(); // VULNERABLE!
// BAD: whereRaw/orderByRaw with unescaped input
User::orderByRaw($userInput); // VULNERABLE!
User::groupByRaw($userInput); // VULNERABLE!
// BAD: DB::statement with concatenation
DB::statement("INSERT INTO users (email) VALUES ('{$userInput}')"); // VULNERABLE!
Attribute Casting
final class User extends Authenticatable
{
protected $casts = [
'email_verified_at' => 'datetime',
'is_admin' => 'boolean', // Cast to boolean prevents string injection
'settings' => 'array', // Automatically json_encode/json_decode
'metadata' => 'encrypted:array', // Laravel 11+ encrypted casting
'password' => 'hashed', // Laravel 10+ auto-hashes on set
];
}
Model Security
final class User extends Authenticatable
{
// Hide sensitive attributes from JSON/API responses
protected $hidden = [
'password',
'remember_token',
'two_factor_secret',
'two_factor_recovery_codes',
];
// Append only safe computed attributes
protected $appends = ['full_name']; // safe
// NEVER append sensitive computed data
}
final class Post extends Model
{
// Global scope to filter soft deleted records
use SoftDeletes;
// Prevent N+1 by restricting lazy loading (optional strict mode)
// AppServiceProvider::boot()
// Model::preventLazyLoading(!app()->isProduction());
}
CSRF Protection
Default Protection
// Laravel CSRF is enabled by default via VerifyCsrfToken middleware
// app/Http/Kernel.php (protected $middlewareGroups['web'])
// All POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE forms must include @csrf
<form method="POST" action="/posts">
@csrf
<input type="text" name="title">
<button type="submit">Create</button>
</form>
Excluding Routes (Carefully)
// app/Http/Middleware/VerifyCsrfToken.php
class VerifyCsrfToken extends Middleware
{
// Only exclude routes that have external CSRF protection (webhooks, etc.)
protected $except = [
'stripe/*', // Stripe webhooks use their own signature verification
// Avoid blanket 'api/*' — stateful Sanctum routes need CSRF.
// Exclude only specific stateless webhook/endpoint routes.
];
}
CSRF with JavaScript
<meta name="csrf-token" content="{{ csrf_token() }}">
<script>
// Axios example (Laravel ships with Axios)
axios.defaults.headers.common['X-CSRF-TOKEN'] = document.querySelector(
'meta[name="csrf-token"]'
).getAttribute('content');
// Fetch example
fetch('/posts', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'X-CSRF-TOKEN': document.querySelector('meta[name="csrf-token"]').getAttribute('content'),
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
},
body: JSON.stringify(data),
});
</script>
XSS Prevention
Blade Templating Security
{{-- SAFE: Auto-escaped by Blade --}}
{{ $userInput }}
{{-- DANGEROUS: Raw output — NEVER use with user input --}}
{!! $userInput !!}
{{-- SAFE: Only use {!! !!} with trusted content you control --}}
{!! $trustedHtmlFromYourServer !!}
{{-- GOOD: Use specific escaping directives --}}
@js($data) {{-- JSON encode for JavaScript --}}
@json($data) {{-- JSON encode in templates --}}
{{-- BAD: Direct user input in raw HTML --}}
<div>{!! $user->bio !!}</div> {{-- VULNERABLE if user provides bio --}}
Safe HTML Handling
// When you must allow some HTML, use a whitelist approach
use HTMLPurifier; // Requires: composer require ezyang/htmlpurifier
public function sanitizeHtml(string $dirty): string
{
$config = \HTMLPurifier_Config::createDefault();
$config->set('HTML.Allowed', 'p,b,i,a[href],ul,ol,li,br');
$config->set('URI.AllowedSchemes', ['http', 'https', 'mailto']);
$purifier = new \HTMLPurifier($config);
return $purifier->purify($dirty);
}
// In blade:
<div>{!! $sanitizedContent !!}</div> {{-- Safe after purification --}}
JavaScript Context Escaping
{{-- SAFE: Blade @js escapes for JavaScript context --}}
<script>
const user = @js($user); // JSON + escaped for JS context
const settings = @json($settings); // Direct JSON encode
</script>
{{-- DANGEROUS: Manual JSON in JS context --}}
<script>
const user = {{ json_encode($user) }}; // NOT escaped for JS!
</script>
HTTP Headers for XSS Protection
// App\Http\Middleware\SecurityHeaders.php
class SecurityHeaders
{
public function handle(Request $request, Closure $next): mixed
{
$response = $next($request);
$response->headers->set('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
$response->headers->set('X-Frame-Options', 'DENY');
$response->headers->set('X-XSS-Protection', '1; mode=block');
$response->headers->set('Referrer-Policy', 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin');
$response->headers->set(
'Content-Security-Policy',
"default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'"
);
return $response;
}
}
// Register in kernel
protected $middleware = [
\App\Http\Middleware\SecurityHeaders::class,
];
Input Validation
Form Request Validation
final class StorePostRequest extends FormRequest
{
public function authorize(): bool
{
return $this->user()?->can('create', Post::class) ?? false;
}
public function rules(): array
{
return [
'title' => ['required', 'string', 'max:255', 'sanitize_html'],
'content' => ['required', 'string', 'max:10000'],
'image' => [
'required',
'image',
'mimes:jpg,jpeg,png,gif,webp', // Whitelist specific types
'max:2048', // 2MB max
],
'tags' => ['array'],
'tags.*' => ['integer', 'exists:tags,id'],
];
}
public function messages(): array
{
return [
'title.max' => 'Post title must not exceed 255 characters.',
'image.max' => 'Image must be under 2MB.',
];
}
// Sanitize input after validation
public function validated($key = null, $default = null): mixed
{
$validated = parent::validated();
$validated['title'] = strip_tags($validated['title']);
return $key ? ($validated[$key] ?? $default) : $validated;
}
}
Custom Validation Rules
// app/Rules/StrongPassword.php
class StrongPassword implements Rule
{
public function passes($attribute, $value): bool
{
return preg_match('/^(?=.*[a-z])(?=.*[A-Z])(?=.*\d)(?=.*[@$!%*?&#^()_\-+=])[A-Za-z\d@$!%*?&#^()_\-+=]{12,}$/', $value);
}
public function message(): string
{
return 'The :attribute must be at least 12 characters with uppercase, lowercase, number, and symbol.';
}
}
// app/Rules/NotBlacklistedDomain.php
class NotBlacklistedDomain implements Rule
{
private array $blacklisted = ['mailinator.com', 'guerrillamail.com'];
public function passes($attribute, $value): bool
{
$domain = substr(strrchr($value, '@'), 1);
return !in_array(strtolower($domain), $this->blacklisted);
}
public function message(): string
{
return 'Email from disposable domains is not allowed.';
}
}
API Security
Rate Limiting
// App/Providers/RouteServiceProvider
protected function configureRateLimiting(): void
{
RateLimiter::for('api', function (Request $request) {
return Limit::perMinute(60)->by($request->user()?->id ?: $request->ip());
});
RateLimiter::for('auth', function (Request $request) {
return Limit::perMinute(5)->by($request->ip())
->response(function () {
return response()->json([
'message' => 'Too many login attempts. Try again in 1 minute.',
], 429);
});
});
RateLimiter::for('uploads', function (Request $request) {
return Limit::perHour(10)->by($request->user()?->id ?? $request->ip())
->response(function () {
return response()->json([
'message' => 'Upload limit reached. Try again later.',
], 429);
});
});
}
// Route usage
Route::middleware(['auth:sanctum', 'throttle:api'])->group(function () {
Route::apiResource('posts', PostController::class);
});
Route::post('/login', [AuthController::class, 'login'])
->middleware('throttle:auth');
API Authentication — Sanctum vs Passport
// Sanctum (recommended for most apps — simple, first-party, SPA)
// config/sanctum.php
'expiration' => 60 * 24, // Tokens expire after 24 hours
'model' => User::class,
// Issuing scoped tokens
$token = $user->createToken('client-name', [
'posts:read',
'posts:write',
])->plainTextToken;
// Middleware scoping
Route::middleware('auth:sanctum')->group(function () {
Route::get('/posts', [PostController::class, 'index'])
->middleware('abilities:posts:read');
Route::post('/posts', [PostController::class, 'store'])
->middleware('abilities:posts:write');
});
// Passport (OAuth2 — for third-party clients or complex auth flows)
// Install: composer require laravel/passport
Passport::tokensExpireIn(now()->addDays(15));
Passport::refreshTokensExpireIn(now()->addDays(30));
Passport::personalAccessTokensExpireIn(now()->addMonths(6));
CORS Configuration
// config/cors.php
return [
'paths' => ['api/*', 'sanctum/csrf-cookie'],
'allowed_methods' => ['*'],
'allowed_origins' => explode(',', env('CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS', '')), // Whitelist specific origins
'allowed_origins_patterns' => [],
'allowed_headers' => ['*'],
'exposed_headers' => ['X-Total-Count', 'X-Pagination-Page'],
'max_age' => 0,
'supports_credentials' => true, // Required for Sanctum SPA auth
];
// NEVER: Allow all origins in production unless absolutely necessary
// 'allowed_origins' => ['*'], // Only for truly public APIs
File Upload Security
Validation
public function rules(): array
{
return [
'document' => [
'required',
'file',
'mimes:pdf,doc,docx,xls,xlsx', // Whitelist specific MIME types
'max:10240', // 10MB
'extensions:pdf,doc,docx,xls,xlsx', // Verify extension matches MIME
],
'avatar' => [
'nullable',
'image', // Ensures it's a valid image
'mimes:jpg,jpeg,png,webp',
'max:2048',
'dimensions:min_width=100,min_height=100,max_width=2000,max_height=2000',
],
];
}
Secure Storage
// Store sensitive files on the same private disk used to create temporary URLs.
$path = $request->file('document')->store('documents', 's3');
// Never use the 'public' disk for sensitive documents.
// Use signed URLs for temporary file access
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Storage;
public function download(Document $document)
{
// Requires route-model binding for Document, a persisted $document->path,
// and a DocumentPolicy::download rule registered with Laravel.
// Authorize against the model that owns the file, never a path taken from the request
$this->authorize('download', $document);
// Generate the temporary signed URL (expires in 15 minutes) only after authorization
$url = Storage::disk('s3')->temporaryUrl($document->path, now()->addMinutes(15));
return redirect($url);
}
// Storage configuration for cloud with encryption
// config/filesystems.php
's3' => [
'driver' => 's3',
'key' => env('AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID'),
'secret' => env('AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY'),
'region' => env('AWS_DEFAULT_REGION'),
'bucket' => env('AWS_BUCKET'),
'url' => env('AWS_URL'),
'endpoint' => env('AWS_ENDPOINT'),
'use_path_style_endpoint' => env('AWS_USE_PATH_STYLE_ENDPOINT', false),
'throw' => false,
'server_side_encryption' => 'AES256', // Encrypt at rest
],
Dependencies and Secrets
Composer Security
# Always audit dependencies in CI
composer audit
# Pin major versions in composer.json
"laravel/framework": "^11.0",
"spatie/laravel-permission": "^6.0"
# Check for abandoned packages
composer why-not
# Keep lock file in version control (it pins exact versions)
# Run `composer update` deliberately, never in CI/CD
Secret Management
# .env file (NEVER commit)
# .gitignore includes .env by default
APP_KEY=base64:abc123...
DB_PASSWORD=secure_password
STRIPE_KEY=sk_live_...
SANCTUM_TOKEN_PREFIX=myapp_
# For production: Use a secret manager
# Deploy with: env $(aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id prod/db | jq ...) php artisan serve
# Validate secrets at boot (AppServiceProvider::boot)
$secrets = ['services.stripe.key', 'services.stripe.webhook_secret'];
foreach ($secrets as $key) {
if (empty(config($key))) {
Log::critical("Missing secret: {$key}");
}
}
Queue Security
// Define a named rate limiter (typically in AppServiceProvider::boot())
RateLimiter::for('payments', fn () => Limit::perMinute(5));
// Encrypt sensitive job data by implementing the interface
final class ProcessPaymentJob implements ShouldQueue, ShouldBeEncrypted
{
use Dispatchable, InteractsWithQueue, Queueable, SerializesModels;
public function __construct(
private readonly string $paymentIntentId, // Public IDs are fine
private readonly string $cardFingerprint, // Encrypted via ShouldBeEncrypted
) {}
public function handle(): void
{
// Process payment
}
// Limit retries and delay between attempts
public function retryUntil(): Carbon
{
return now()->addMinutes(5);
}
// Rate limit how many jobs of this type can run
public function middleware(): array
{
return [
new RateLimited('payments'),
];
}
}
Logging Security Events
// config/logging.php
'channels' => [
'security' => [
'driver' => 'single',
'path' => storage_path('logs/security.log'),
'level' => 'warning',
],
],
// Audit log helper
final class SecurityLogger
{
public static function log(string $event, array $context = []): void
{
Log::channel('security')->warning($event, array_merge([
'user_id' => Auth::id(),
'ip' => request()->ip(),
'user_agent' => request()->userAgent(),
'url' => request()->fullUrl(),
'timestamp' => now()->toIso8601String(),
], $context));
}
}
// Usage
SecurityLogger::log('failed_login_attempt', ['email' => $email]);
SecurityLogger::log('password_change');
SecurityLogger::log('role_change', ['target_user' => $targetId, 'new_role' => 'admin']);
SecurityLogger::log('suspicious_activity', ['reason' => 'multiple_attempts_from_different_ips']);
Quick Security Checklist
| Check | Description |
|---|---|
APP_DEBUG=false | Never run with debug enabled in production |
APP_KEY set | Always run php artisan key:generate |
| HTTPS enforced | Force HTTPS in production via middleware or proxy |
$fillable whitelisted | Never use $guarded = [] |
| CSRF active | @csrf on all state-changing forms |
| Sanctum/Passport configured | API authentication with token abilities/scopes |
| Rate limiting applied | Throttle API and auth endpoints |
| Input validation | FormRequest with specific rules, never $request->all() |
| File upload restrictions | Validate MIME types, size, dimensions |
composer audit in CI | Check dependencies for known vulnerabilities |
password_hash / password_verify | Use Laravel's built-in hashing (bcrypt/Argon2) |
| Session regeneration on login | Call $request->session()->regenerate() |
| Security headers middleware | CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options |
| Logged security events | Audit log for auth failures, role changes, suspicious activity |
.env not committed | Verify .gitignore includes .env |
Related Skills
laravel-patterns— Laravel architecture, routing, Eloquent, and API patternsbackend-patterns— General backend API and database patternslaravel-tdd— Laravel testing with PHPUnit and Pest
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Full-stack diagnostic for agent and LLM applications. Audits the 12-layer agent stack for wrapper regression, memory pollution, tool discipline failures, hidden repair loops, and rendering corruption. Produces severity-ranked findings with code-first fixes. Essential for developers building agent ap
Head-to-head comparison of coding agents (Claude Code, Aider, Codex, etc.) on custom tasks with pass rate, cost, time, and consistency metrics. Use when choosing between coding agents, or when a change to an agent setup needs measured pass rate, cost, and time rather than an impression.
Design and optimize AI agent action spaces, tool definitions, and observation formatting for higher completion rates. Use when defining or revising an agent's tool set, action space, or observation format.
Structured self-debugging workflow for AI agent failures using capture, diagnosis, contained recovery, and introspection reports. Use when an agent run fails and you need a reproducible diagnosis instead of a retry.
Add x402 payment execution to AI agents with per-task budgets, spending controls, and non-custodial wallets. Supports Base through agentwallet-sdk, X Layer through OKX Payments / OKX Agent Payments Protocol, and Solana plus multi-network EVM through the upstream x402 packages with facilitator-based
Verify a local agent API, temporary gateway tunnel, and remote sandbox callback with a tool-free task, then restore the original app connection.
Security hardening guidance for AI agent frameworks that process untrusted content, invoke tools, write workspace files, manage runtime identifiers, or handle credentials. Use when building or reviewing an agent runtime, autonomous worker, tool gateway, memory service, or multi-tenant agent deployme
Related security skillsscan passed
Security audit: supported static findings; qualified profiles add reproduction and repair candidates. (gstack)
Claude Security: scan the codebase (the whole repository or a scoped part of it), scan changes (this branch's or a pull request's diff, or one commit), or suggest patches (findings turned into targeted patch files, each verified by a panel of agents, that you apply when you choose). Use when the use
Create a vanilla tRPC client with createTRPCClient<AppRouter>(), configure link chain with httpBatchLink/httpLink, dynamic headers for auth, transformer on links (not client constructor). Infer types with inferRouterInputs and inferRouterOutputs. AbortController signal support. TRPCClientError typin
Hardens code against vulnerabilities. Use when auditing an input handler for vulnerabilities, when handling user input, authentication, data storage, or external integrations, or when checking a login flow is safe against the OWASP Top Ten. Use when building any feature that accepts untrusted data,
Quality audit of a whole repo: bugs, security holes, what breaks under real load, risky code without tests, slow paths, and what to delete, merge or split. Ranked, each finding explained in plain English. One-shot report, changes nothing. Use for "audit this codebase", "review the whole repo", "find
Audits Firebase (Firestore, Cloud Storage) security rules for vulnerabilities, privilege escalation, role bypasses, create vs update inconsistencies, resource exhaustion, type safety, size limits, and hasOnly ownership checks. Use when auditing/reviewing rules, running red-team rule assessments, or